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NOTES
"Contort": Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance,
Commercial Contracts-Its Existence and
Desirability
Every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing which prohibits any contracting party from injuring an-
other party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement.'
Breach of this implied covenant creates a cause of action in con-
tract. Beginning twenty-five years ago, some courts also recognized
a cause of action in tort for breach of this implied convenant in
insurance contracts. 2
In recent years, the California courts, the leaders in the devel-
opment of "contort," 3 have repeatedly faced the issue whether
courts should expand its application beyond the insurance context.4
Resolution of the issue is important because tort treatment enables
a plaintiff to recover damages ordinarily not recoverable in a con-
1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); see also notes 12-17 infra
and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 691 (1979), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980); Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). Although California courts developed this
tort cause of action, courts of other states also have allowed tort recovery for breach of the
implied covenant in insurance cases. See Kornblum, Recent Cases Interpreting the Implied Cove-
nant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 30 DEF. L.J. 411, 431 n.50 (1981) (listing cases from 17
other states). This note makes no attempt to address the desirability of the tort of breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context.
3 This note will use the term "contort" to refer to the tortious breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the cause of action sounds in both tort and
contract. Cf. Briiggemeier, Perspectives on the Law of "Contorts" A Discussion of the Dominant
Trends in West German Tort Law, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 355 (1983).
Legal commentators, however, have used various names such as the tort of the "In-
surer's Mistaken Judgment," the "New Tort of Outrage." "'Gruenberg-ian Tort," "Tort of
Bad Faith," "Tortious Breach of Contract," "Tortious Interference with a Protected Prop-
erty Interest," and "Bad Faith Breach" to refer to the tort cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context. See Comment, The
New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. American Home Assurance Corp., 13
TULSA L.J. 605, 625 (1978).
4 See notes 23-26 infra and accompanying text. Several commentators also have ad-
dressed the question. See Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If At All,
Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425 (1981); Kornblum,
Recent Cases Interpreting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 30 DEF. L.J. 411
(1981); Louderback &Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16
U.S.F.L. REV. 187 (1981); Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 163 (1983).
NOTES
tract action, such as damages for mental suffering,- losses not fore-
seeable at the time of contracting, 6 and punitive damages. 7 In
Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. ,s the Supreme
Court of California recently faced the question: "May a plaintiff re-
cover in tort for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in a noninsurance, commercial contract?" 9 Although
the court did not directly answer this question, the court's language
indicates that breach of the covenant in a commercial context may
create a tort cause of action.' 0
Part I of this note discusses the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing inherent in every contract. Part II traces the development
of the tort cause of action for breach of the covenant in noninsur-
ance cases in California, discusses the Seaman's case, and analyzes
other recent cases interpreting the tort cause of action for breach of
the implied covenant. Part III discusses the desirability of allowing
tort recovery for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in ordinary commercial contracts." Part IV suggests
that an award of attorneys' fees under the "bad faith" exception to
the American rule better solves the problems that the California
cases raise. Part V concludes that the "contort" cause of action
threatens to literally "contort" the interrelationship between con-
tract and tort law.
I. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
and Its Breach
A. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 205 provides:
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
5 "Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused
bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional distur-
bance was a particularly likely result." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981).
Corbin explains that breaches of contract, in general, do not cause as much resentment
or other mental anguish and physical discomfort as do the wrongs labeled "torts." Even
Corbin, however, warns that there is no exact line between the two causes of action. See 5
A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1076 (1964).
6 See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
7 "Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct
constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981); see note 94 infra; see also 5 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1077 (1964).
8 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
9 Id. at 758, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
10 The court explicitly declined to decide whether the breach of the implied covenant
always gives rise to a tort cause of action. 36 Cal. 3d at 768, 769, 686 P.2d at 1166, 1167,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 362, 363; see notes 42-57 infra and accompanying text.
11 This note uses the term "ordinary commercial contract" to refer to the situation in
which the contracting parties occupy relatively equal bargaining positions.
1985]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
fair dealing in its performance and enforcement."' 2 Good faith
performance or enforcement of a contract requires faithfulness to
the agreed common purpose and protects the justified expectations
of the parties. The duty prohibits "bad faith" conduct which vio-
lates community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonable-
ness.' 3 Both the common law and the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") impose the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. Under the common law, the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing prohibits the contracting parties from injuring another
party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement.' 4
Under U.C.C. section 1-203, every contract or duty under the
U.C.C. imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement.' 5 U.C.C. section 1-201(19) defines good faith as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."' 6
Although U.C.C. section 1-102(3) allows the parties, by agreement,
to determine the standards by which they will measure the obliga-
tion of good faith, the parties cannot disclaim the obligation. 17
B. Remedies for Breach of the Implied Covenant
While courts uniformly recognize the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, they disagree as to the proper remedy
for its breach. Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 205 com-
ment (a) supports alternative remedies for breach of the covenant,
stating that the appropriate remedy varies with the circumstances.18
Courts, however, initially treated a breach of the covenant as creat-
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); see 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 654A (Kaufman ed. Supp. 1984); 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 670 (3d ed. 1961); see also Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-
Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); Summers, "Good Faith"
in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV.
195 (1968).
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a (1981).
14 See, e.g., Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163,
167 (1933) ("[In every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing."); see also Burton, supra note 12, at 404 (listing cases
recognizing a general obligation of good faith performance in every contract at common
law).
15 U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977); see Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IowA L. REV. 1 (1981).
16 U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977). In the case of a merchant, good faith means "honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
17 Id. § 1-102(3). The parties, however, may not establish manifestly unreasonable
standards. Id
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a (1981).
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ing a cause of action in contract.' 9
But in the seminal case of Comunale v. Traders & General Insur-
ance Co.,20 the California Supreme Court recognized that breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance
contracts could constitute a tort.21 Thereafter, courts in many
other states allowed tort recovery for breach of the implied cove-
nant in insurance contracts. 22
A tort remedy for the breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is separate and distinct from a cause of action
for breach of contract. Consequently, the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing has a significant impact on both contract and
tort law. Today, courts face the question whether they should ex-
tend "contort" into noninsurance, commercial cases.
II. The Development of "Contort" as a Remedy for the Breach
of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
in Noninsurance Cases
A. Early California Cases
After Comunale, California courts initially rejected expanding
the doctrine into noninsurance contracts.23 Twenty-two years later,
19 See note 14 supra and note 43 infra.
20 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). In Comunale, the court held:
EAin insurer, who wrongfully declines to defend and who refuses to accept a rea-
sonable settlement within the policy limits in violation of its duty to consider in
good faith the interest of the insured in the settlement, is liable for the entire
judgment against the insured even if it exceeds the policy limits.
Id. at 661, 328 P.2d at 202.
21 Other courts have cited Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967), as originally stating the proposition that breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance contract created a cause of action in tort.
See, e.g., Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1116, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127
(1984). In a footnote, the Crisci court stated: "In any event Comunale expressly recognizes
that 'wrongful refusal to settle has generally been treated as a tort.'" 66 Cal. 2d at 432 n.3,
426 P.2d at 178 n.3, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18 n.3.
In Crisci, the California Supreme Court affirmed an award of $25,000 for mental suffer-
ing against the insurer, not for a bad faith breach of contract, but for failure to meet the
duty to accept reasonable settlements-a duty within the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
22 See Kornblum, supra note 4, at 431 n.50 (listing 17 states that have adopted the tort
cause of action in the insurance context).
23 In Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Marina View Heights Dev., Inc., 66 Cal. App.
3d 101, 133, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802, 820 (1977), the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
trict, upheld an award of punitive damages on the theory of promissory fraud. While stat-
ing that courts may not ordinarily award punitive damages for breach of contract, the court
declared that courts may award punitive damages when a defendant fraudulently induces a
plaintiff to enter into a contract. In a footnote, the court observed:
While a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may give
rise to a cause of action sounding in tort in the insurance field, we are not aware of
any appellate court case, and none has been cited, extending that principle to
other contractual relationships.
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however, in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,24 the California Supreme
Court suggested that breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contracts could sound in tort as
well as in contract. 25 Since Tameny, three other courts have recog-
Id. at 135 n.8, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 822 n.8 (citations omitted).
In Sawyer v. Bank of Am., 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978), the defend-
ant bank refused to reimburse plaintifffor fire damage to his truck. Insurance coverage had
allegedly lapsed because of the bank's failure to renew the insurance policy covering the
truck. The California Court of Appeal, First District, held that the defendant bank had not
violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in denying its liability. The
court reasoned:
[I]t is not a tort for a contractual obligor to dispute his liability under the contract.
Rather, the tort of breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
consists in bad faith action, extraneous to the contract, with the motive intention-
ally to frustrate the obligee's enjoyment of contract rights.
Id. at 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625. One judge, however, dissented on the ground that the
court should have awarded tort damages for mental suffering for the bank's breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 141, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (Rattigan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980), the California
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, again refused to recognize the tort cause of action in a
loan transaction. The court indicated, however, that the doctrine was not necessarily lim-
ited to insurance transactions. The court held that the plaintiffs had not stated a cause of
action against the defendant bank for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in a loan transaction. The plaintiffs had alleged that the bank acted in bad faith by
withholding information about the plaintiff's investment in a cattle-raising program. Based
on the following discussion, the court of appeal assumed, but did not decide, that a bad
faith cause of action may arise from a borrower-lender relationship:
In every contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
A breach of this duty may be a tort as well as a breach of the underlying
contract. However, not every breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
creates liability in tort. A bad faith cause of action sounding in tort has never been
extended to contractual relationships other than in the insurance field. This does
not mean such claims are limited only to insurance transactions. Modern tort law
is not confined to causes of action recognized by legal precedent.
Id. at 33, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520 (citations omitted). The court also observed:
While [the duty of good faith and fair dealing] exists in addition to any contractual
obligation, the nature and extent of the requirements of fair dealing are deter-
mined by the agreement itself (Austero v. National Cas. Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 27,
148 Cal. Rptr. 653).
Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
24 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
25 Plaintiff alleged defendant had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by wrongfully discharging him after 15 years of service for refusing to participate in
an illegal scheme to fix gasoline prices. The California Supreme Court concluded that
plaintiffs complaint stated a cause of action under California's common law wrongful dis-
charge doctrine. Therefore, the court did not reach the question whether plaintiff could
recover in tort for breach of the implied covenant. In dicta, however, the court suggested
that breach of the implied covenant in employment contracts sounds in tort as well as in
contract:
[W]e believe it is unnecessary to determine whether a tort recovery would addi-
tionally be available. . . on the theory that Arco's discharge constituted a breach
of the implied-at-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every
contract. We do note in this regard, however, that authorities in other jurisdic-
tions have on occasion found an employer's discharge of an at-will employee viola-
tive of the employer's "good faith and fair dealing" obligations and past California
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nized that breach of the implied covenant in an employment con-
tract may create a cause of action in tort.26
Accordingly, prior to the Seaman's case, courts holding that a
breach of the implied covenant could constitute a tort confined tort
application to insurance and, under certain circumstances, employ-
ment contracts. 27 Nevertheless, plaintiffs continued to urge the
courts to expand tort damages for breach of the implied covenant
to ordinary commercial contracts.
B. Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.
Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. 28 arose from
a complex factual setting in which the defendant, Standard Oil
Company of California, Inc. ("Standard"), allegedly entered into an
agreement to supply petroleum products to the plaintiff, Seaman's
Direct Buying Service, Inc. ("Seaman's"). To qualify for a lease,
Seaman's had to submit evidence of a written agreement with an oil
supplier.29 After lengthy negotiations and upon Seaman's repeated
cases have held that a breach of this implied-at-law covenant sounds in tort as well
as in contract.
Id. at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12 (citations omitted).
26 In Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980), the
California Court of Appeal, Second District, held that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of
action for wrongful discharge. The court of appeal found that defendant's termination of
an oral employment contract after 18 years of satisfactory performance without legal cause
offended the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all con-
tracts. Furthermore, defendant's expressed policy requiring a "fair, impartial and objective
hearing" for adjudicating employee disputes indicated the defendant-employer had recog-
nized its responsibility to engage in good faith and fair dealing rather than in arbitrary
conduct towards all of its employees.
In Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981), the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal, First District, held that an employee discharged after 32 years had
demonstrated a prima facie case of wrongful termination in violation of employer's implied
promise that the corporation would not act arbitrarily in dealing with the employee.
Although the court mentioned Cleary v. American Airlines, the court did not base its hold-
ing on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 859 (1982), defendant terminated the plaintiffs' employment after 25, 17, and 18 years
of service, respectively. Plaintiffs alleged only lengthy service to defendant and the exist-
ence of personnel policies or oral representations showing an implied promise by the de-
fendant not to act arbitrarily in dealing with its employees. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
defendant's contention that the jury could not award emotional distress and punitive dam-
ages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under California law
under the circumstances.
For a discussion of the arguments against application of the implied covenant to em-
ployment contracts, see Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV.
153 (1981).
27 See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 181 Cal. Rptr. 126, 134 (Cal.
App. 1982) (not officially published, see 129 Cal. App. 3d 416), vacated, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686
P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109,
1116, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (1984).
28 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
29 Id at 759, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356. Seaman's, a dealer in ship sup-
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requests for an instrument evidencing a binding commitment, Stan-
dard wrote a letter to Seaman's, stating the terms of the "agree-
ment."30 The letter satisfied the lease requirement, and Seaman's
signed the lease. 31 After intervening events, however, Standard
adopted a "no new business" policy. Consequently, Seaman's and
Standard never signed the contemplated agreement, 32 and subse-
quently, Standard refused to supply oil to Seaman's.33 As a result,
Seaman's defaulted on the lease and discontinued operations3 4
Seaman's then sued Standard, claiming breach of contract, fraud,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
interference with a contractual relationship. Upon appeal from a
judgment for Seaman's on all but the fraud claim,3 5 the California
Court of Appeal reversed the judgment as to the breach of the im-
plied covenant and the interference claims.3 6 Seaman's appealed to
plies and equipment, sought to lease a large portion of a redeveloped marina from the City
of Eureka. The City's bonding consultants required evidence of a binding agreement with
an oil supplier before they would approve the lease to Seaman's.
30 Id. at 760, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356. The letter contained significant
ambiguity as to whether the letter represented an "offer" or a "mutual agreement ... of
the final agreements." 181 Cal. Rptr. at 129. An agent of Seaman's signed the letter under
the legend, "we accept and agree to the terms and conditions stated herein," and returned
two copies to Standard. 36 Cal. 3d at 760, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
31 36 Cal. 3d at 760, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
32 Id. at 761, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
33 Standard indicated that new federal regulations, requiring suppliers to supply previ-
ous customers, posed the only barrier to contract. Id. With Standard's help and advice,
Seaman's sought relief from the allocation program to enable Standard to legally supply
Seaman's. 181 Cal. Rptr. at 129. Standard even supplied Seaman's with the forms neces-
sary to seek a supply authorization from the federal agency and helped Seaman's fill them
out. 36 Cal. 3d at 761, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
The Federal Energy Office ("FEO") eventually issued a supply order. 181 Cal. Rptr. at
129. Standard, however, responded by changing its position, contending that it had never
reached a binding agreement with Seaman's. 36 Cal. 3d at 761, 686 P.2d at 1161-62, 206
Cal. Rptr. at 357-58. Standard appealed the federal supply order, and the FEO rescinded
its earlier order authorizing Standard to supply Seaman's. 181 Cal. Rptr. at 129. Seaman's
then appealed, and the FEO granted an exception from the normal allocation rules stating
that the FEO would issue an order directing Standard to fulfill supply obligations to Sea-
man's when Seaman's filed a copy of a court decree finding that under state law a valid
contract existed between the parties. Standard refused to stipulate to the existence of a
contract, taking a "see you in court" attitude. 36 Cal. 3d at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal.
Rptr. at 358.
34 36 Cal. 3d at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
35 The jury's verdict for Seaman's awarded $397,050 compensatory damages for
breach of contract, $397,050 compensatory damages and $11,058,810 punitive damages
for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and $1,588,200
compensatory damages and $11,058,810 punitive damages for intentional interference with
an advantageous business relationship. The trial court conditionally granted Standard's
motion for a new trial unless Seaman's consented to a reduction of punitive damages to
$6,000,000 on the interference claim and $1,000,000 on the good faith claim. Seaman's
consented to the reduction and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. Id.
36 Standard appealed from the judgment and the trial court's denial of its motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Seaman's cross-appealed from the trial court's re-
mittitur of punitive damages. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the
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the California Supreme Court.
After holding that the letter satisfied the statute of frauds37 and
that an erroneous instruction about Standard's intent on the inter-
ference claim constituted reversible error,38 the California Supreme
Court turned to the issue of "whether, and under what circum-
stances, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in a commercial contract may give rise to an action in
tort."39 Interestingly, the parties argued extreme positions before
the California Supreme Court. Seaman's contended that breach of
the covenant always gives rise to a tort cause of action.40 Standard,
on the other hand, argued that courts have always limited tort ac-
tions for breach of the implied covenant to the insurance context.4'
The court began its analysis by emphasizing that California law
implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.42
The court cited several California cases where the court provided
contract remedies for breach of the covenant in diverse contractual
contexts. 43 Next, the court reviewed the establishment of the tort
judgment for Seaman's on the action for intentional interference with contractual relations
and economic advantage. The court of appeal also reversed the judgment for Seaman's on
the action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and instructed the
court to dismiss the count, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. 181 Cal. Rptr.
126 (Cal. App. 1982). The court's opinion stated:
We detect an unwillingness on the part of the Supreme Court to expand the law
allowing recovery in tort, including punitive damages, for the breach of every com-
mercial contract. Where the dominant purpose of such a contract is merely the
obtaining of a commercial advantage and there attends to it no particular aspect of
protection against mental distress, no special relationship giving rise to public pol-
icy or public interest considerations and no lack of balance in the contractual rela-
tionship as is characteristic in contracts of adhesion, tort recovery including
punitive damages is not available.
[The state of the law shows insurance cases do not necessarily represent the limit
of possibility of tort recovery. We can properly conclude, however, it is not avail-
able in ordinary commercial contracts.
Id. at 135-36.
37 36 Cal. 3d at 765, 686 P.2d at 1164, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
38 Id. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1165-66, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62.
39 Id., 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
40 Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
41 Id. at 767-68, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. Standard argued that the
court should continue this limitation. Id.
42 Id. at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362; see Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818, 620 P.2d 141, 145, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 695 (1979), appealdismissed
and cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573, 510
P.2d 1032, 1036, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 484 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967) ("in every contract, including policies
of insurance, there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing"); Comunale v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958).
43 36 Cal. 3d at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362; see, e.g., Brown v. Superior
Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949) (agreement to make mutual wills [specific per-
formance]); Cordonier v. Central Shopping Plaza Assocs., 82 Cal. App. 3d 991, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 558 (1978) (lease [damages]); Osborne v. Cal-Am Fin. Corp., 80 Cal. App. 3d 259,
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remedy in insurance cases. Noting that breach of the implied cove-
nant in an insurance contract justifies imposition of tort liability,
the court observed that California decisions had emphasized the
"special relationship" between insurer and insured, characterized
by elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibil-
ity.44 The court noted that in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,45 it had
suggested that breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in the employment relationship might also give rise to a tort cause
of action.46 Therefore, the court recognized that other relation-
ships involving similar characteristics deserved similar legal
treatment:
In holding that a tort action is available for breach of the cove-
nant in an insurance contract, we have emphasized the "special
relationship" between insurer and insured, characterized by ele-
ments of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility.
No doubt there are other relationships with similar characteris-
tics and deserving of similar legal treatment.
When we move from such special relationships to consider-
ation of the tort remedy in the context of the ordinary commer-
cial contract, we move into largely uncharted and potentially
dangerous waters. . . .This is not to say that tort remedies
have no place in such a commercial context, but that it is wise to
proceed with caution in determining their scope and
application. 47
In the context of ordinary commercial contracts, the court ad-
vised caution in determining the scope and application of tort rem-
edies because (1) courts could have difficulty distinguishing
between breach of the covenant and breach of the underlying con-
tract, and (2) tort remedies might frustrate the contracting parties'
expectations. 48 In commercial contracts, roughly equal bargaining
power enables the parties to shape the contours of the agreement
and include provisions for attorneys' fees and liquidated damages
in the event of breach.49 Furthermore, while U.C.C. section 1-
102(3) prohibits the parties from disclaiming the covenant of good
faith, the parties may, within reasonable limits, agree upon the stan-
dard by which the courts will measure application of the implied
145 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1978) (agreement to sell real property [rescission]); Masonite Corp. v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 1, 135 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1976) (contract to provide
utility services [damages]); Foley v. U.S. Paving Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 499, 68 Cal. Rptr.
780 (1968) (employee incentive contract [damages]).
44 36 Cal. 3d at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362; see Egan v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
45 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); see note 25 supra.
46 36 Cal. 3d at 769 n.6, 686 P.2d at 1166 n.6, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 n.6.
47 Id. at 768-69, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63 (citation and footnote
omitted).
48 Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
49 Id.
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covenant.5 0
Consequently, the court chose not to decide whether breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing always gives rise
to an action in tort.5 1 The court recognized, however, that a party
to a contract may incur tort liability if, after breaching the contract,
the party seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith,
that the contract exists. 52 According to the court, such an attempt
to avoid all liability under a contract by adopting a "stonewall" or
"see you in court" position without reasonable belief in the exist-
ence of a defense goes beyond the mere breach of a contract and
offends accepted notions of business ethics.53 Therefore, the court
concluded that an award of tort remedies in this scenario does not
intrude upon the bargaining relationship or frustrate the con-
tracting parties' reasonable expectations. 54
The trial court's instructions allowed the jury to find Standard
liable if the jury found that Standard had denied the existence of a
valid contract regardless of whether Standard made the denial in
good or bad faith. 55 A contracting party may, however, dispute lia-
bility under a contract in good faith.5 6 Concluding that the jury
reasonably could have and probably would have reached a result
more favorable to Standard in the absence of the erroneous instruc-
tion, the court reversed the judgment for Seaman's on the breach
of the implied covenant claim.57
50 Id.
51 l
52 Id.
53 Id. at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
54 Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
55 The trial judge instructed the jury: "[W]here a binding contract [has] been agreed
upon, the law implies a covenant that neither party will deny the existence of a contract,
since doing so violates the legal prohibition against doing anything to prevent realization of
the promises of the performance of the contract." Id.
56 Id.; see Sawyer v. Bank of Am., 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625
(1978). In Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 917 (1980), the court held that refusal to settle a case, thus forcing plaintiff to bring an
action to establish its rights did not constitute a tort: "Nothing in the case law suggests that
liability may stem from the defense of a lawsuit or from the decision to defend rather than
settle. Such a rule would infringe basic rights in our system ofjurisprudence." Id. at 729
(emphasis in original).
57 36 Cal. 3d at 774, 686 P.2d at 1170, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 366. In an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part, ChiefJustice Bird urged that the majority opinion refused to
acknowledge that the court's past decisions, analyzing the scope of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, compelled the court's holding that a contracting party's denial
of the existence of a valid contract in an attempt to shield itself from liability for breach of
that contract gives rise to an action in tort. Id. (Bird, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). ChiefJustice Bird would have affirmed the judgment for Seaman's for breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing while expressly recognizing that a breach of the
contract may support a tort cause of action for breach of the implied covenant under certain
circumstances. Id. at 775, 784, 686 P.2d at 1171, 1177, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367, 373.
In her opinion, when courts decide what conduct constitutes a tortious breach of the
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Thus, in Seaman's, the California Supreme Court recognized
the new tort of wrongful denial of the existence of a contract, but
avoided the question whether a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in a commercial contract always gives
rise to an action in tort. While apparently acknowledging the tort of
bad faith breach of contract, however, the court did not specify
when courts should extend "contort" to noninsurance cases. The
court suggested that courts should only extend tort liability to cases
involving relationships with "similar characteristics" to those found
in insurance contracts. Thus, the Seaman's court did not explicitly
recognize tortious breach of the implied convenant in commercial
cases. On the other hand, the court did very little to reject its
application.
C. Cases After Seaman's
Since Seaman's, other courts have taken different positions re-
garding the impact of the California Supreme Court's decision. In
Wallis v. Superior Court,58 the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
covenant, the courts consider the parties' reasonable expectations regarding the nature and
purpose of the agreement and the underlying rights and responsibilities. Id at 776, 779,
686 P.2d at 1171, 1174, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 367, 370; see, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818, 620 P.2d 141, 145, 169 Cal. Rptr 691, 695 (1979), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 921 n.5, 582
P.2d 980, 986 n.5, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 395 n.5 (1978); Austero v. National Cas. Co., 84 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 27-32, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653, 670-73 (1978); Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins.
Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 941, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 487 (1975). Contracting parties expect
that a breaching party will compensate the nonbreaching party for damages caused by the
breaching party's failure to perform. 36 Cal. 3d at 777, 686 P.2d at 1173, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
369. When the breaching party acts in bad faith by denying the existence of the contract in
an attempt to shield itself from liability for breach of the contract, this denial violates the
duty of good faith and fair dealing because the nonbreaching party justifiably expects that
the breaching party will pay compensation for the damages incurred as a result of the
breach. Accordingly, Standard's conduct, in ChiefJustice Bird's opinion, constituted a tor-
tious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 779-80, 686 P.2d
at 1174, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
ChiefJustice Bird would also recognize tortious breach of the implied covenant when
the parties do not accept or reasonably expect the possibility that one party will breach the
contract. For example, at the time of contracting, the parties may expressly indicate an
understanding that they will not permit breach of the contract. In insurance and employ-
ment contracts, the parties may realize from the inception of the contract that contract
damages would provide inadequate compensation for breach. Id. at 780, 686 P.2d at 1174,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 370. ChiefJustice Bird also concluded that if a plaintiff can show, under
certain circumstances or characteristics of the contract, a justifiable expectation that the
other party would not breach, a voluntary breach of the acknowledged contract could consti-
tute a violation of the duty to deal fairly and in good faith without an independent showing
of bad faith. Id. at 781, 686 P.2d at 1175, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 371. Since Standard did not
voluntarily breach an acknowledged contract, but denied the existence of the contract, Chief
Justice Bird would require Seaman's to prove Standard made the denial in bad faith.
58 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984). In Wallis, plaintiff sued defendant
for terminating a contract that the parties signed when defendant laid off plaintiff after 32
years of employment. The contract provided that, in exchange for the plaintiff-employee's
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trict, addressed the issue whether the plaintiff had successfully
pleaded a cause of action for tortious breach of an employment
contract. 59 The court concluded the complaint stated a cause of
action and interpreted the Seaman's decision as acknowledging,
however tentatively, the validity of extending the tort of bad faith
breach of the implied convenant to contracts outside the insurance
context. 60 The court of appeal admitted that the California
Supreme Court had not specified the circumstances justifying such
an extension.6' The court, however, wrote that in its view the Sea-
man's decision indicated that courts should only extend the tort to
cases involving relationships with "similar characteristics" to those
found in insurance contracts. 62
The Wallis court then attempted to enumerate the "similar
characteristics" necessary for tort liability: (1) the parties must oc-
cupy inherently unequal bargaining positions; (2) a non-profit moti-
vation such as peace of mind, security, or future protection must
provide the incentive for entering into the contract; (3) ordinary
contract damages must fail to .provide adequate compensation to
the injured party because (a) they do not require the party in the
superior bargaining position to account for its actions, and (b) they
do not make the injured party "whole"; (4) the type of harm that
one party may suffer and the necessary trust that this party places in
the other party to perform must leave the first party especially vul-
nerable to breach; and (5) the other party must know of this vulner-
ability. 63 Wallis marks the first attempt by the California courts to
articulate specific guidelines for the expansion of the tort to nonin-
surance contracts.
In contrast, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth District, in
Quigley v. Pet, Inc. ,64 interpreted the Seaman's decision as avoiding a
broad rule which would impose tort liability regardless of special
relationships, justifiable expectations, and public policy.65 In
Quigley, a case involving commerical enterprises occupying equal
bargaining positions, the court reversed a judgment awarding $3.8
million in punitive damages for breach of the implied covenant of
promise not to compete with the defendant's business, the company would pay him a cer-
tain amount monthly until he turned 65. Defendant made the payments for three years
until new management terminated the payments.
59 Id. at 1113, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
60 Id. at 1116, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
64 162 Cal. App. 3d 223, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984). In Quigley, plaintiffs sued defend-
ants for allegedly wrongful conduct arising out of a written contract for hauling raw walnuts
for the defendant corporation.
65 Id. at 237, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
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good faith and fair dealing. The court stated that "[t]here was no
admitted special relationship which would provide an exception to
the rule restricting relief to contract damages." 66 According to the
court: "In Seaman's, the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought a judicially
declared rule that whatever the contractual relationship, a bad faith posi-
tion taken by a contracting party exposes that person to tort liabil-
ity, including punitive damages." 67 Consequently, the court con-
cluded: "[A]t least for the present, courts must enforce the rule of
'contract damages only,' unless an exception is found which is not
foreign to those already approved." 68
Finally, in Eaton Corp. v. Detrick,69 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, held that,
under California law, coutrts may award tort remedies, including pu-
nitive damages, for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in an employment contract. 70 The court of appeals
did not reach the question whether courts may award tort damages
for breach of the implied covenant in an acquisition agreement. 71
The court noted that in Seaman's the California Supreme Court left
open the question of when there can be recovery in tort for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing outside the
insurance and employment contexts. 72
Departing from early cases rejecting "contort" in ordinary
commercial cases, Seaman's appears to recognize its viability outside
the insurance context. Later cases, though cautious, have inter-
preted "contort" in such a way that the doctrine seems likely to
expand into ordinary commercial contracts. Consequently, the
legal community should question the appropriateness of this poten-
tial expansion before it occurs.
III. Should Courts Recognize "Contort" for Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
Ordinary Commercial Contracts?
Exposing the parties to ordinary commercial contracts to po-
tentially large tort damages could serve both useful and harmful
purposes. Arguably, courts should treat acts of bad faith and un-
fairness more severely than bona fide defaults on contractual spe-
66 Id. at 239, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
67 Id. at 235, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (emphasis in original).
68 Id. at 237, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
69 Eaton Corp. v. Detrick, No. 83-1841, 83-1872 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1984). In Eaton,
plaintiff was the president of a company which was acquired by another corporation, which
in turn was acquired by defendant. Plaintiff was apparently promised long-term employ-
ment and a secure future after the acquisition.
70 Id., slip op. at 10-1 1.
71 Id. at 12.
72 Id.
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cifics. Moreover, as a matter of public policy and sound morality,
courts should not condone unethical behavior regardless of the
context in which it occurs. Finally, threat of "contort" liability may
discourage unethical business practices. 73
Nevertheless, for three reasons, courts should not extend the
tort of bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to ordinary commerical contracts. First, while a special
relationship characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion,
and fiduciary responsibility exists between an insurer and the in-
sured, these factors do not arise in commercial contracts where the
parties possess presumably equal bargaining power.74 Absent
these special circumstances, the remedy for breach of the implied
covenant should lie only in contract.
Second, if courts apply tortious breach of contract uniformly to
any and all breaches of contract, the new doctrine could entirely
replace "ordinary" breach of contract. 75 Finally, strong public pol-
icy concerns counsel against introducing potentially large tort dam-
ages into the ordinary commercial context.76
A. Insurance is a Quasi-Public Industry
Courts recognizing a tort cause of action, in the insurance con-
text, have focused on the existence of a "special relationship" be-
tween the insurer and the insured to justify imposing the duty as a
matter of law, independent of the underlying promissory obliga-
tions in the contract itself.77 This "special relationship" and the
vulnerability of the insured are the public policy bases for allowing
tort remedies for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in insurance cases. In Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Co.,78 the California Supreme Court observed that "[i]nsurers hold
themselves out as fiduciaries" 79 and that "the relationship of in-
surer and insured is inherently unbalanced" 80 as reflected in "the
73 See Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d at 237, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 403. On the other
hand, an unrestricted rule of tort liablity for unfair dealing could convert routine breach of
contract cases into "contort" jury trials because parties may easily raise issues of fact re-
garding perceived tortious conduct. Id. at 238, 208 Gal. Rptr. at 403.
74 See notes 77-84 infra and accompanying text.
75 See Chilton, Editor's Viewpoint, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 276, 278 (1980); see also notes 90-93
infra and accompanying text.
76 See notes 94-99 infra and accompanying text.
77 Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 686 P.2d 1158,
1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984); see, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d
809, 820, 620 P.2d 141, 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691, 696 (1979), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
445 U.S. 912 (1980).
78 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
79 Id. at 820, 620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
80 Id.
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adhesive nature of insurance contracts. '"81 In addition, the insured
does not seek a commercial advantage, but rather protection and
peace of mind and security.8 2 The insurance industry's "quasi-pub-
lic"8 3 nature justifies the exception for breach of insurance con-
tracts. The obligation of good faith and fair dealing requires
qualities of decency and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of
a fiduciary.84
This special relationship does not exist in ordinary commercial
contracts where the contracting parties do not occupy a fiduciary
relationship. Furthermore, since parties of roughly equal bargain-
ing power shape the contours of their agreement, adhesion con-
tracts are the exception rather than the rule. While U.C.C. section
1-102(3) prohibits the parties from disclaiming the covenant of
good faith, the parties, within reasonable limits, may define the
standards under which they will measure application of the
covenant.
Given the basis for the very existence of the tort remedy, courts
should not expand the availability of tort remedies to ordinary com-
mercial contracts where these "special relationships" do not exist.
The common law has declined to permit tort recovery based upon
allegations of failure to perform contractual obligations absent a
fiduciary or other similar special relationship between the parties.8 5
For this reason, courts in several jurisdictions have declined to rec-
ognize tort liability for alleged breaches of the implied covenant in
commercial contracts.8 6 Courts should protect the distinction be-
81 Id.
82 Id. at 819, 620 P.2d at 145, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 695; see Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66
Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967).
83 See Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 668 n.5, 456 P.2d 674,
680 n.5, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 n.5 (1969).
84 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 620 P.2d at 146, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
85 Prosser and Keeton note that cases imposing tort liability for failure to perform a
contract include situations involving (1) a "common calling" such as common carriers, inn-
keepers, public warehousemen, and public utilities; (2) a special relationship between the
parties such as bailments, employment agreements, or lease arrangements which creates a
duty of affirmative care; or (3) fraud in the inducement. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 92, at 662-64 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
86 See, e.g., Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 837-38 (2d
Cir. 1980); Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111, 118 (6th Cir. 1976) ("The
special considerations existent in a consumer-held insurance contract do not apply to an
ordinary contract between businessmen."); Iron Mountain Sec. Storage v. American Speci-
ality Foods, 457 F. Supp. 1158, 1168 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("Defendants have cited no case from
any jurisdiction that has extended the tort law theory beyond the insurance context to
breach of other commercial contracts."); Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 442, 234 N.W.2d
775, 790 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 424 U.S. 902, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 945
(1976) ("A malicious or bad-faith motive in breaching a contract does not convert a con-
tract action into a tort action."); Tibbs v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d
281, 291, 369 N.E.2d 1218, 1225 (1977) ("characterizing an action as one 'willfully, wan-
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tween contracts in a quasi-public industry and contracts in the ordi-
nary commericial context.
B. A Tort Cause of Action Could Entirely Replace Actions for
Breach of Contract
Although law, rather than consensual agreement, imposes the
duty of good faith and fair dealing,87 not every breach of a legal
duty should create a cause of action in tort. Courts originally
awarded contract damages for breach of the implied covenant.88
Only later did courts in many states begin awarding tort damages
for breach of the implied covenant in insurance cases.8 9 Awarding
tort remedies for every breach of the implied covenant could elimi-
nate "ordinary breach of contract."
At least one article has suggested that the duty of good faith,
imposed regardless of consent, provides the potential for greater
integration of the two theories of civil liability within the bargain
relationship.90 While recent decisions have seriously undermined
the traditional distinctions between contract and tort liability, 9' to-
tal merger of the concepts would be unfortunate. 92 Since every
tonly, and maliciously' done adds nothing new to a cause essentially directed to securing
relief for a breach of contract").
87 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 574, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 485 (1973).
88 See Burton, supra note 12, at 404 (1980) (listing cases awarding contract damages for
breach of the implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also note 43 supra.
89 See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
90 Speidel, supra note 4, at 195-96.
91 Id. at 188-93.
92 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984);
Diamond, supra note 4, at 433-39; Louderback & Jurika, supra note 4, at 202-06; Speidel,
supra note 4, at 168-74.
Although tort law and contract law developed from a common origin, the common law
has recognized distinct differences between civil actions for tort and breach of contract.
Historically, causes of action in tort and contract have had different purposes and have
protected different interests.
In contract law, the failure, without justification, to perform an enforceable promise
creates a cause of action for breach of contract. Contract law does not require the injured
party to prove the breaching party negligently or intentionally breached the contract. Con-
sequently, commentators have described contract law as a theory of strict rather than fault-
based liability. Contract law provides remedies for both misfeasance or defective promised
performance and nonfeasance or failure to render promised performance.
In contract law, the parties' duties extend to third party beneficiaries. The parties'
agreement defines the duties of the parties, but courts sometimes supplement the parties'
agreement by filling in any gaps in the contract. Consequently, by their agreement, the
contracting parties can limit the scope and content of their contractual duties. Accordingly,
courts rarely use public policy considerations to interfere with the obligations and duties
that the contracting parties negotiated.
The remedies in contract law protect the injured party's reasonable expectations by
awarding the injured party the value of the breaching party's promised performance or "the
benefit of the bargain." Courts generally award money damages over specific performance.
Furthermore, courts have generally limited the recoverable damages to economic losses
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breach of contract injures the right of another party to receive the
benefits of the agreement, every breach of contract would also in-
clude a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. In commercial contracts, courts would have difficulty
distinguishing the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and breach of the underlying contract. 93
C. Public Policy Reasons Support Limited Measure of Damages in
Contract Cases
Strong public policy concerns support the limited measure of
damages in contract cases. Courts traditionally have awarded dam-
ages for breach of contract to compensate the aggrieved party
rather than to punish the breaching party.94 When courts interject
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the execution of the contract. As a general rule,
courts have refused to award damages for mental suffering and punitive damages for
breach of contract, even though the defendant wilfully breached the contract.
Tort law protects members of society from the unreasonable conduct of others by re-
quiring certain minimal standards of conduct. In tort law, public policy helps to determine
what particular acts will constitute a tort. Courts impose tort liability for losses resulting
from intentional or negligent conduct or unreasonably dangerous activities. Absent special
circumstances, nonfeasance does not create tort liability. In summary, fault and motive
determine liability much more so in tort law than in contract law.
In tort law, the tortfeasor's duty extends to those persons within a legally defined
zone of risk" that the actor's tortious conduct has created. Courts define and impose
duties by operation of law. Tort law protects an individual's person, property, and existing
relationships from unauthorized harm or infringement.
Tort remedies attempt to restore the injured party to the position occupied before the
tortious conduct. The remedial relief may include an award for mental anguish, punitive
damages if the tortfeasor conduct was intentional, wilful or wanton, and all losses, whether
foreseeable or not at the time of the tort, if an intentional tort caused the loss.
93 See Chilton, supra note 75, at 278. Proponents of "contort" would argue that al-
lowing tort recovery for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not
automatically convert every breach of contract action into a tort cause of action. Under
"contort," arguably, the aggrieved party may only recover tort damages when the other
party breaches the covenant-not the underlying contract from which the covenant arose.
As one court put it:
[I]f the cause of action arises from a breach of a promise set forth in the contract,
the action is ex contractu, but if it arises from a breach of duty growing out of the contract it
is ex delicto.
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 175, 610 P.2d 1330, 1334-35, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 843-44 (1980) (emphasis in original); see Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d
566, 577-78, 510 P.2d 1032, 1039-40, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 487-88 (1973);Jarchow v. Trans-
america Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 940, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 486 (1975).
94 "The purpose[] of awarding contract damages is to compensate the injured party."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 comment a (1981). The assumption that a
contracting party may breach the contract at will while risking only contract damages is one
of the cornerstones of contract law. As Richard Posner wrote: "[I]t is not the policy of the
law to compel adherence to contracts, but only to require each party to choose between
performing in accordance with the contract and compensating the other party for any injury
resulting from a failure to perform." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55 (1972). In
most commercial contracts, the parties accept the possibility of breach, particularly because
their right to recover contract damages provides adequate protection. Seaman's Direct
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tort remedies into commercial contracts, they frustrate the con-
tracting parties' expectations because, in most cases, the parties an-
ticipate contract damages as the only remedy for purposeful
breaches of contract.95 Moreover, "contort" could impede com-
mercial transactions because commercial parties might fear poten-
tially large punitive damage liability for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Insurance generally does
not cover punitive damage awards.96 Furthermore, bankruptcy
courts cannot discharge punitive damage awards in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.97 The risk of a "contort" action may cause a hesitancy to
defend a contract action because a jury may later find such a de-
fense to constitute bad faith.98 Furthermore, from an economic
standpoint, society should, under appropriate circumstances, en-
courage "efficient" breaches of contract. 99 Thus, policy concerns
caution against expanding "contort" into ordinary commercial
contracts.
IV. An Alternative-Awarding Attorneys' Fees
When facing a case involving potentially unethical conduct,
policy considerations pressure a court to punish the wrongdoer.
While the courts should not condone unethical conduct, courts
should not ignore traditions deeply rooted in our legal heritage. If
a court finds that a breaching party wrongfully denied the existence
of a contract and forced the aggrieved party to incur significant in-
convenience, time, and expense to vindicate the aggrieved party's
contractual rights, the courts have an alternative other than ex-
panding "contort" into noninsurance, commercial contracts.
Courts can award attorneys' fees to successful parties harmed by
unethical litigation tactics.
Although the "American rule"100 generally prohibits an award
Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d at 778, 686 P.2d at 1173, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 369
(Bird, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95 Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 223, 239, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 404 (1984) (cit-
ing ChiefJustice Bird's concurring and dissenting opinion in Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.
v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d at 778, 686 P.2d at 1173, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 369).
96 See, e.g., Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 762-63, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 237, 250 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1051 (1981).
97 Id. at 763, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 250; see I1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1982).
98 Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 App. 3d at 237, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
99 The "efficient breach" theory downplays the "wrongfulness" of the breaching
party's conduct, emphasizes the economic reasons permitting reinvestment of the "net
gain" from the breach in other economic opportunities, and assumes that the injured party
can recover full compensation from the breaching party in a relatively quick and costless
litigation. Contra Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947
(1982).
100 Under the traditional "American rule," courts will not award attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party unless a statute makes attorneys' fees a part of costs or an enforceable
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of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, a "bad faith" exception
permits an award of attorneys' fees if the losing party acted "in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 10' More-
over, at least one state has enacted a statute which expressly per-
mits the award of attorneys' fees in contract actions. 0 2 The award
of attorneys' fees based on a defendant's bad faith seeks to punish
the defendant and to compensate the plaintiff for the added ex-
pense of having to vindicate clearly established rights in court.
Such an award would be especially appropriate when a party in bad
faith denies the existence of a contract. Furthermore, since the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the appropriateness of
the bad faith exception, 0 3 awards of attorneys' fees will not frus-
trate the expectations of the parties. Finally, by requiring substanti-
ation of attorneys' fees awarded, courts could "limit" such awards
to actual expenditures, rather than allowing juries to award large
tort damages for breach of the implied covenant.
Courts should allow tort damages only if the conduct of the
breaching party amounts to a breach of the implied covenant and
independently establishes the elements of a common law tort such as
fraud. 10 4 In this situation, courts may and should award punitive
damages if the plaintiff proves the required fraud, oppression, or
malice. This requirement maintains the symmetry of the general
rule of not allowing punitive damages for breach of contract, be-
cause the court awards the punitive damages for the tort, not for
breach of contract. Furthermore, the independent tort require-
ment facilitates judicial review of the evidence by limiting the scope
of review to a search for the elements of the tort. 05 Therefore, an
award of attorneys' fees under the "bad faith" exception to the
American rule provides a viable alternative to "contort."' 10 6
contract authorizes such an award. Consequently, each party, as a general rule, bears his
own attorneys' fees. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
101 Id. at 5; see also 6J. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.77[2], at 1709 (2d ed. 1983).
102 See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (1982).
103 See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); F. D. Rich
Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1 (1973); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
104 As a last resort, courts could adopt the Indiana approach under which courts may
award punitive damages in certain circumstances for breach of contract. In Vernon Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976), the Indiana Supreme Court
approved awarding punitive damages in a breach of contract case if (1) the defendant has
committed a serious wrong, even though the wrong does not fit into the confines of a previ-
ously recognized tort, and (2) the deterrent effect that punitive damages will have upon the
future conduct of the wrongdoer and other similarly situated parties will serve the public
interest. Id. at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180; see also Jones v. Abriani, 169 Ind. App. 556, 350
N.E.2d 635 (1976).
105 264 Ind. at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180.
106 Interestingly, the California Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted the "bad
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V. Conclusion
Courts should award tort damages for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing only when the defendant's
conduct constitutes an independent intentional tort apart from the
breach of the implied covenant. Decisions holding that breach of a
contract-even an intentional breach of a contract-justifies tort
remedies on the basis of the breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing could have an adverse long-term impact on
business negotiations and contracting. "Contort" literally takes a
"contorted" approach to the interrelationship between contract
and tort law. Rather, when faced with situations involving unethical
conduct, courts should award attorneys' fees under the bad faith
exception to the "American rule." Such an award would preserve
the distinction between contract and tort damages, protect the con-
tracting parties' expectations, and deter unethical conduct.
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faith" exception to the American rule. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Har-
bor Ins. Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d 105, 114, 149 Cal. Rptr. 313, 319 (1978) ("[T]he federal bad
faith exception, has never been accepted in California. . .and as the lower appellate court
in this state we do not deem it appropriate for us to adopt ajudicial doctrine which our high
court has not yet approved."); Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 50 Cal. App. 3d
449, 469, 123 Cal. Rptr. 683, 695 (1975) ("Assuming, without deciding, that the California
Supreme Court may, on a proper day in a proper case, incorporate the federal equitable
rule into the law of California, it is clear that it has not yet done so.").
Dicta, however, suggests that the California Supreme Court may incorporate the ex-
ception into the law of California:
[E]ven assuming that a California court. . . may in its discretion award attorneys
fees to one party as a sanction for vexatious and oppressive conduct on the part of
another party or its counsel (a matter which we are not required to, and do not,
decide today), it appears that the trial court did exercise its discretion on that basis
and did determine that a prior monetary sanction was sufficient in the
circumstances.
D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 27, 520 P.2d 10, 29, 112 Cal. Rptr.
786, 805 (1974); see also Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 42, 569 P.2d 1303, 1312, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 324 (1977); Residents Ad Hoc Stadium Comm. v. Board of Trustees, 89 Cal.
App. 3d 274, 293, 152 Cal. Rptr. 585, 597 (1979) ("The 'vexatious litigant' theory presup-
poses that the party seeking to recover fees has prevailed."); County of Inyo v. City of Los
Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 3d 82, 91, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71, 77 (1978) ("We assume existence of
power to make the award [of attorneys' fees] on [the 'vexatious litigant'] ground ...
abstain from affirming the power[,] and reject the claim for lack of merit.").
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